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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
: Case No. 20040570-CA 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, 
v. 
CARL STANLEY FLEMING, (incarcerated) 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this case involving first degree felony convictions 
entered in a court of record and transferred from the Utah Supreme Court, by virtue of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
1. Do the erroneous jury instruction and verdict require reversal of the aggravated 
kidnaping conviction? 
Jury instructions are reviewed without deference for correctness. See, e^ , State v. 
Vialpando, 2004 UT App 95 at f 9, 89 P.3d 209. 
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The issues raised on appeal were not raised by trial counsel. In raising them for 
the first time on appeal, Fleming relies on the ineffective assistance of counsel, plain 
error, and extraordinary circumstances doctrines. 
2. Does ineffective assistance by trial counsel require a new trial? 
This issue was not raised below, but is raised for the first time on appeal. 
In assessing the claim, this Court will determine whether, as a matter of law, trial 
counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards of representation, and 
whether any objectively deficient performance was prejudicial. See, e.g.. State v. 
Maestas, 1999 UT 32, fl 20, 984 P.2d 376; Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), 
cert, denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994). 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are copied in the 
addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
The State charged Fleming by information with one count of aggravated kidnaping 
and two counts of aggravated robbery (R. 4-6). 
At the preliminary hearing, with the State's agreement, Magistrate William B. 
Bohling dismissed one count of aggravated robbery and then issued a bindover order on 
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the remaining counts (R. 37; R. 151 at 41-42). 
John K. West represented Fleming at trial (R. 24). 
The jury convicted Fleming of aggravated kidnaping and aggravated robbery (R. 
124). 
Judge Lindberg sentenced Fleming to a term often years to life on the aggravated 
kidnaping and a concurrent term of five years to life for aggravated robbery (R. 130-32). 
Trial counsel filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 136). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
FACTS PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
The prosecution's theory of the case was that Fleming kidnaped and robbed 
Stephen Porter, a senior at B YU, who visited his parents two or three times a month, who 
never used illegal drugs in his life, and who was buying gasoline from Wayne's Comer 
gas station when he met Fleming, whom Porter agreed to drive to the hospital for 
treatment of Fleming's injured hand. Kg. R. 152 at 70-93. Porter claimed that they drove 
in Porter's car to various ATMs for withdrawals from Porter's account against Porter's 
wishes, because Fleming pulled some kind of a blade and held it near Porter's neck, and 
also threatened to shoot him with a gun that Fleming said he had but that Porter never saw 
(R. 152 at 78, 81). 
In contrast, Fleming's theory of the case was that Porter was at Wayne's gas 
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station, where many people conduct illegal drug sales, to buy illegal drugs, and that 
Porter's allegations of kidnaping and robbery were Porter's revenge for Fleming's selling 
Porter rock salt when Porter thought he was buying methamphetamine with the money 
from the ATMs (Rg, R. 152 at 64-69). 
The only evidence which partially supported Porter's version of events was the 
testimony of Sharon Thompson, a regular user of cocaine, who was living at a halfway 
house at the time of her testimony because her parole had been revoked for drug use, and 
whom the prosecutor granted transactional immunity for, inter alia, aggravated 
kidnaping, aggravated robbery, and unlawful use of a financial transaction card, in 
exchange for her testimony (R. 152 at 43-45). 
She testified that on a day that she had been using cocaine, Fleming and Porter 
picked her up and drove her around to the ATMs while she withdrew the money with 
Porter's card, with Porter's permission, after he repeatedly gave her the personal 
identification number she needed to use with the card to get the money from the ATMs 
(R. 152 at 114-120). She testified that she knew that what they were doing was wrong at 
some point (R. 152 at 120), and that she opted to take some of the money and leave Porter 
and Fleming after they reached the withdrawal maximum and could not get any more 
money (R. 152 at 119). She never saw Fleming using any weapon or threatening Porter's 
life, but said that Fleming interrupted to stop her and Porter from talking to one another 
(R. 152 at 120,126). 
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There was significant evidence that cast substantial doubt on Porter's version of 
events, and supported Fleming's. 
A videotape and photograph of one of the ATM transactions shows Porter 
following Thompson and Fleming into and out of the 7-11 without any visible coercion of 
any kind (R. 152 at 86,140-44; State's Exhibit 1; Defendant's Exhibit 10), countering the 
notion that Fleming was holding Porter against his will and robbing him. 
Porter testified that Fleming asked Porter if he could smoke in his car (R. 152 at 
88) - peculiarly polite behavior coming from a purported aggravated kidnapper and 
robber. 
While Porter did not mention it on direct examination, Porter conceded on cross-
examination that there was a vial containing what appeared to be drugs in his car, and 
only during cross-examination, he claimed that Fleming asked Porter to hold Fleming's 
vial of methamphetamine during the course of this supposed robbery and kidnaping, 
before any of the visits to the ATM (R. 152 at 101). 
Porter did not explain why Fleming, a supposed meth user, would hand his drugs 
over to a robbery and kidnaping victim (R. 152 at 110). 
While Porter reiterated that he held the vial carefully on the edges to preserve 
Fleming's prints (R. 152 at 110,R. 151 at 21,25), he did not explain how he managed to 
do this when he followed Fleming and Thompson into the 7-11. 
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Porter made some effort to convey how traumatized he was after the aggravated 
kidnaping and robbery, describing how he called his parents, who were at the Jordan 
River Temple (R. 152 at 93). He never did explain, however, why he felt the need to take 
the time to search the crack in his car seat where he found the vial of drugs before he 
called the police to report the robbery (R. 152 at 108-09). 
Porter claimed that despite having lived at the same location hear 3500 South in 
West Valley City for the twenty-three years of his life, and despite having come home to 
visit his parents two or three times a month while staying at BYU, he was unfamiliar with 
gas stations on routes more direct from BYU to his parents' home than the Wayne's 
Comer station on 1300 South and State Street (R. 152 at 94-95). 
In contrast to Fleming's theory that Porter was at Wayne's Comer to transact in 
illegal drugs, Porter maintained that he was at Wayne's Comer buying gasoline and mints 
on his debit card when he met Fleming (R. 152 at 75-76). Detective Mitchell testified 
that he subpoenaed records of all of Porter's debit card transactions on November 7, and 
the records did not show any purchases at Wayne's Comer (R. 152 at 137-39). 
When trial counsel led him to so testify, Mitchell explained that he was not sure if 
he had subpoenaed the record of the Wayne's Comer transaction and may have been in 
error in testifying that he had sought all records for the date of November 7, and may 
have only requested transactions involved in the alleged robbery (R. 152 at 138-140). 
FACTS PERTAINING TO ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT 
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FOR AGGRAVATED KIDNAPING1 
The aggravated kidnaping charge was premised on Fleming's alleged intent to 
"facilitate the commission or attempted commission of a felony, or flight from a felony" 
(R. 40). The elements instruction for aggravated kidnaping relied solely on the same 
theory as was charged -
... That such seizure, confinement, detention, or transportation was 
committed with the intent to facilitate the commission, attempted 
commission, or flight after commission or attempted commission of a 
felony. 
(R. 121). 
The definition instruction for aggravated kidnaping, however, listed three theories 
to define the crime, including two that were never charged or bound over after the 
preliminary hearing: 
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to 
compel a third person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from 
engaging in particular conduct; or 
(b) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight 
after commission or attempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another. 
(R. 117). 
The verdict for aggravated kidnaping was general, and did not reveal which felony 
*Copies of the information, all jury instructions and the verdict are in the 
addendum to this brief. 
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the jury chose as the basis for that conviction (R. 124). 
It cannot be assumed that the jurors applied the elements instruction, rather than 
the definition instruction, because the judge instructed the jurors to follow all of the 
instructions and give them equal weight (R. 97). 
While the jurors were instructed that they each had to agree with each verdict (R. 
108), they were not instructed that they had to reach a unanimous verdict on the factual 
theory underlying the aggravated kidnaping conviction. 
FACTS PERTAINING TO CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Trial counsel did not point out the bizarre nature of Porter's claim that Fleming, a 
supposed meth user, asked his supposed robbery and kidnaping victim to hold his vial of 
drugs during the course of the supposed kidnaping and robbery. 
Nor did he ask Porter how he managed to hold the vial with two fingers while he 
was following Fleming and Thompson into and out of the 7-11. 
Nor did he point out the unusual claim that prior to this supposed aggravated 
kidnaping and robbery, Fleming supposedly asked Porter's permission to smoke a 
cigarette in his car. 
Trial counsel never asked Porter why he was searching his car before he called the 
police to report the robbery. 
Despite the fact that Sharon Thompson was allowed to testify without any 
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elaboration that she knew at some point that what they were doing was wrong (R. 152 at 
120), trial counsel did not reiterate her testimony that she used Porter's card and personal 
identification number with his express permission (R. 152 at 117). Nor did counsel 
impeach her with, or otherwise inform the jurors of, her bias - that she was testifying 
against Fleming in exchange for transaction immunity for all conceivable offenses arising 
from this incident (R. 152 at 43-45). 
Trial counsel repeatedly reiterated Porter's claim that Fleming held a blade to his 
throat (R. 152 at 99-100), and introduced a photograph of a weapon with two blades that 
Fleming was carrying when he was arrested about two months after the alleged robbery 
and kidnaping (R. 152 at 132-33). The prosecutor led the investigator to testify on cross 
that the weapon found on Fleming matched the description provided by Porter (R. 152 at 
148). 
Apparently recognizing trial counsel's error in introducing this damaging 
evidence, after closing argument by defense counsel, the trial court ruled that the knife 
was inadmissible and that there was no credible or other evidence that the knife found on 
Fleming was ever present on November 7 (R. 152 at 162). 
In order to convict Fleming of aggravated kidnaping, the jurors had to find that he 
held Porter against his will in connection with a felony (e.g. R. 121). The jurors were 
instructed that using a financial transaction card without the owner's consent with the 
intent to obtain property or money worth more than $1,000 is a felony (R. 119). The 
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jurors were also instructed that theft of over $19000 is a felony (R. 120). 
The only evidence that was presented that there was intent to obtain more than 
$1,000 was the testimony of Detective Mitchell and the transaction receipts he presented 
showing attempted withdrawals totaling $1,029 (R. 152 at 137-39; Defense Exhibits 1-7). 
This evidence was presented by trial counsel in the defense case. 
The receipts reflect that all transactions occurred between 8:19 and 9:33 p.m. 
(defense exhibits 1-7), apparently before Porter first met Fleming, given Porter's 
testimony that he left Provo at about 9:00 p.m. to drive to Salt Lake (R. 152 at 70-72). 
Defense counsel did not point out this significant discrepancy between the physical 
evidence and Porter's version of events. 
Trial counsel informed the trial court that he had no objections to the State's 
proposed jury instructions and that he found them to be appropriate (R. 152 at 5). Trial 
counsel did not object to the non-unanimous verdict, and conflicting jury instructions on 
aggravated kidnaping. 
Despite the fact that there was no evidence that the alleged kidnaping was legally 
distinct from the alleged robbery, trial counsel made no motion to vacate the aggravated 
kidnaping conviction or to merge the aggravated kidnaping conviction into the aggravated 
robbery conviction. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
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The erroneous jury instructions and verdict fundamentally undermine the 
aggravated kidnaping conviction. 
This Court should reverse both of Mr. Fleming's convictions because there is a 
reasonable probability of a different result if he is given a new trial which is free of the 
instances of ineffective assistance of counsel and plain errors which occurred in this case. 
Particularly because the evidence against Mr. Fleming was not compelling, trial 
counsel's introduction of harmful evidence, failure to recognize and assert helpful 
evidence, and failure to object to the erroneous jury instructions and verdict constituted 
objectively deficient and prejudicial performance. 
Because the aggravated kidnaping conviction should have merged and because 
there was insufficient evidence to sustain it as a matter of law, this Court should forbid 
the retrial of that count. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
REVERSAL OF THE AGGRAVATED KIDNAPING COUNT 
IS REQUIRED BY THE ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
AND VERDICT. 
The aggravated kidnaping charge was premised on Fleming's alleged intent to 
"facilitate the commission or attempted commission of a felony, or flight from a felony" 
(R. 40). The elements instruction for aggravated kidnaping relied solely on the same 
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theory as was charged -
... That such seizure, confinement, detention, or transportation was 
committed with the intent to facilitate the commission, attempted 
commission, or flight after commission or attempted commission of a 
felony. 
(R. 121). 
The definition instruction for aggravated kidnaping, however, listed three disparate 
factual theories to define the crime: 
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to 
compel a third person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from 
engaging in particular conduct; or 
(b) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight 
after commission or attempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another. 
(R. 117). 
It cannot be assumed that the jurors applied the elements instruction, rather than 
the definition instruction, because the judge instructed the jurors to follow all of the 
instructions and give them equal weight (R. 97). The law presumes that jurors follow all 
instructions. See, og,, State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 272 (Utah 1998) ("Moreover, our 
judicial system greatly relies upon the jury's integrity to uphold the jury oath, including its 
promise to follow all of the judge's instructions."). 
While the jurors were instructed that they each had to agree with each verdict (R. 
108), they were not instructed that they had to reach a unanimous verdict on one factual 
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theory underlying the aggravated kidnaping conviction. 
The verdict for aggravated kidnaping was general, and did not reveal which theory 
the jury chose as the basis for that conviction (R. 124). 
The fact that the jurors were given the options of convicting Fleming on the basis 
of two factual theories that were never pled or bound over,2 requires a new trial, because 
Fleming never had a preliminary hearing on, and was never bound over on, these crimes, 
and thus the district court had no jurisdiction to try him for them. 
Article I §§ 12 and 13 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(e), 
and Utah R. Crim. P. 7 guarantee the accused's right to a preliminary hearing on the 
offense of conviction. See, e.g.. id. See also. State v. Ortega. 751 P.2d 1138,1139 (Utah 
1988). 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, Article I §§ 7,10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution, and Utah Code Ann. § 
77-l-6(l)(f) protect the accused's right to a fair and impartial trial. See also, e.g.. State v. 
2Instruction 117 provided, 
Under the law of the State of Utah, a person commits Aggravated 
Kidnaping if that person intentionally or knowingly, without authority of 
law and against the will of the victim, by any means and in any manner 
seizes, confines, detains, or transports the victim with intent: 
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to 
compel a third person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from 
engaging in particular conduct; or 
(b) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight 
after commission or attempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another. 
(R. 117). Subsections (a) and (c) were not pled or bound over. 
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Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, cert denied. 484 U.S. 1044 (1988) (recognizing right under state 
and federal due process provisions); State v. Johnson. 475 P.2d 543 (Utah 1970) 
(recognizing right under Article I § 10); State v. Kendrick. 538 P.2d 313 (Utah 1975) 
(recognizing right under Article I § 12). 
These provisions of constitutional law provide related protections in this context, 
for preliminary hearings are essential to fair trials, because they allow the defendant to 
understand and discover the State's case, to discover and preserve favorable evidence, 
and to ferret out groundless prosecutions. See, generally, e.g.. State v. Anderson, 612 
P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utah 1980). 
Fleming could not have had a fair trial on the two factual theories that were not 
pled or addressed at the preliminary hearing, because he had no notice that he was 
accused of these offenses, and had no opportunity to prepare to meet them. 
Utah has long recognized that a preliminary hearing is essential to a district court's 
jurisdiction over a felony. See, e.g.. State v. Freeman, 71 P.2d 196,199 (Utah 1937) 
("The right of the district court to try any one for a felony rests upon the filing in such 
court of a proper indictment by grand jury, or the filing of a proper information by the 
district attorney, or other proper counsel for the state. And such information can be filed 
properly, only after the accused has been duly bound over and held to answer in the 
district court by a magistrate having jurisdiction to investigate the charge and determine if 
there is probable cause to believe an offense has been committed and that defendant is 
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guilty thereof"). See, also, State v. Jensen, 96 P. 1085 (Utah 1908) (defendant could not 
be tried for offense distinct from that upon which he had preliminary hearing). 
This Court should reverse the aggravated kidnaping conviction, because Fleming 
may well have been convicted of aggravated kidnaping on the basis of one of the two 
unpled theories of aggravated kidnaping included in Instruction 20, offenses for which the 
district court had no jurisdiction, see i&, and offenses for which he could not have had a 
fair trial, for lack of notice and an opportunity to prepare to meet the charges following a 
proper preliminary hearing, see, e ^ , Ortega and Anderson, supra. 
The fact that the jurors were informed of three alternate factual theories for the 
kidnaping conviction, but were not required to reach a unanimous verdict as to which act 
they convicted Fleming of in entering the aggravated kidnaping conviction, establishes a 
violation of Fleming's right to a unanimous jury verdict on each element of each offense 
charged. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 10 provides, "... In criminal cases the verdict shall 
be unanimous;' In State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951 the court reversed a 
conviction for sexual abuse of a child, finding plain error in a jury instruction that the 
jurors were not required to unanimously find which act occurred. Id. at \ 61. While 
Saunders was a plurality decision, it has since been cited by the full court for the 
proposition that "Article I § 10 of the Utah Constitution requires jury verdicts in criminal 
cases to be unanimous." State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, f 32, 40 P.3d 611. 
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The fact that the jury was not required to reach a unanimous verdict as to which of 
the three disparate factual theories of aggravated kidnaping set forth in Instruction 20 
justifies a new trial. See Saunders, supra. 
Trial counsel did not object to any of the jury instructions or the verdict, and 
informed the court that he had reviewed the instructions and found them to be appropriate 
(EL 152 at 5). 
Despite the fact that trial counsel did not object to the errors discussed above, this 
Court nonetheless should address the errors, and may do so under the 
extraordinary circumstances, plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines. 
Courts utilize the extraordinary circumstances doctrine in cases involving '"rare 
procedural anomalies,'" as a "'safety device'" to avoid manifest injustice. State v. 
Nelson-Waggoner. 2004 UT 29, \ 23, 94 P.3d 186. 
Application of this doctrine would be appropriate ia this case, because Mr. 
Fleming is currently serving a ten year to life prison sentence for aggravated kidnaping, a 
very serious offense of which he should not have been convicted, particularly given the 
confusing instructions on aggravated kidnaping, which may have resulted in a conviction, 
despite the fact that the jurors may not have reached a unanimous verdict, and/or may 
have convicted Fleming for a factual theory that was never charged or bound over by a 
magistrate after preliminary hearing. The procedural facts of this case thus do establish 
rare procedural anomalies, and manifest injustice, and require reversal of the aggravated 
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kidnaping conviction. See Nelson-Waggoner, suvra. 
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error 
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness 
prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in 
hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, e,g., State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 
29, 35 andn.8 (Utah), cert denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). 
Reversing Fleming's convictions under the plain error doctrine would be 
appropriate, because at the time of the trial of this case, the law clearly required that 
criminal offenses be charged and bound over after a proper preliminary hearing, e.g., 
Jensen and Ortega, supra, and that jury verdicts be unanimous when a conviction might 
enter on different factual theories, e.g., Saunders, supra. 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment and 
Article I § 12, Fleming must demonstrate that trial counsel's performance fell below 
objectively reasonable standards of representation, and that this objectively deficient 
performance was prejudicial. See e ^ Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert, 
denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994). 
One of the most basic duties of a trial lawyer is to properly raise and preserve all 
issues in the lower court. See, e ^ , State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79 at f 10, 67 P.3d 
1005. 
Trial counsel's failure to object to the erroneous jury instructions and verdict was 
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objectively deficient. Jury instructions are routinely prepared well in advance of the trial, 
and there is no need for this Court to defer to decisions made regarding instructions, 
because these decisions should not be made in the heat of battle. 
Permitting Mr. Fleming to be convicted of the very serious offense of aggravated 
kidnaping on the basis of confusing jury instructions and with a non-unanimous verdict 
form simply does not coalesce into any reasonable trial strategy. 
Trial counsel's errors were prejudicial, for they may well have resulted in a 
conviction for aggravated kidnaping that was premised on the theory that was never 
charged, bound over, or defended against. The errors deprived Fleming of his 
fundamental rights to due process of law, to a fair trial, and to a unanimous jury verdict 
beyond a reasonable doubt with regard to each element of the offense, and there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a different result in their absence, particularly given the relative 
weakness of the State's case against Fleming. 
The only evidence which supported Porter's version of events, that Fleming pulled 
a blade and threatened him with a gun and forced him to drive to various ATMs to make 
withdrawals from Porter's account, was the testimony of Sharon Thompson, a regular 
user of cocaine, who was living at a halfway house at the time of her testimony because 
her parole had been revoked for drug use, and whom the prosecutor granted transactional 
immunity for, inter alia, aggravated kidnaping, aggravated robbery, and unlawful use of a 
financial transaction card, in exchange for her testimony (R. 152 at 43-45). She testified 
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that on a day that she had been using cocaine, Fleming and Porter picked her up and 
drove her around to the ATMs while she withdrew the money with Porter's card, with 
Porter's permission, after he repeatedly gave her the personal identification number she 
needed to use with the card to get the money from the ATMs (R. 152 at 114-120). 
In addition to Thompson's testimony, there was significant evidence that cast 
substantial doubt on Porter's version of events, and supported Fleming's, that Porter made 
the allegations against Fleming after realizing that he had bought rock salt from Fleming, 
rather than methamphetamine. 
A videotape and photograph of one of the ATM transactions shows Porter 
following Thompson and Fleming into and out of the 7-11 without any visible coercion of 
any kind (R. 152 at 86,140-44; State's Exhibit 1; Defendant's Exhibit 10), countering the 
notion that Fleming was holding Porter against his will and robbing him. 
Porter testified that Fleming asked Porter if he could smoke in his car (R. 152 at 
88) - peculiarly polite behavior coming from a purported aggravated kidnapper and 
robber. 
While Porter did not mention it on direct examination, Porter conceded on cross-
examination that there was a vial containing what appeared to be drugs in his car, and 
only during cross-examination, he claimed that Fleming asked Porter to hold Fleming's 
vial of methamphetamine during the course of this supposed robbery and kidnaping, 
before any of the visits to the ATM (R. 152 at 101). 
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Porter did not explain why Fleming, a supposed meth user, would hand his drugs 
over to a robbery and kidnaping victim (R. 152 at 110). 
While Porter reiterated that he held the vial carefully on the edges to preserve 
Fleming's prints (R. 152 at 110, R. 151 at 21, 25), he did not explain how he managed to 
do this when he followed Fleming and Thompson into the 7-11. 
Porter made some effort to convey how traumatized he was after the aggravated 
kidnaping and robbery, describing how he called his parents, who were at the Jordan 
River Temple (R. 152 at 93). He never did explain, however, why he felt the need to take 
the time to search the crack in his car seat where he supposedly found the vial of drugs 
before he called the police to report the robbery (R. 152 at 108-09). 
Porter claimed that despite having lived at the same location in West Valley City 
near 3500 South for the twenty-three years of his life, and despite having come home to 
visit his parents two or three times a month while staying at B YU, he was unfamiliar with 
gas stations on routes more direct from BYU to his parents' home than the Wayne's 
Comer station on 1300 South and State Street (R. 152 at 94-95). 
While Porter maintained that he was not buying drugs at Wayne's Comer, but was 
buying gasoline and mints on his debit card when he met Fleming (R. 152 at 75-76), 
Detective Mitchell testified that he subpoenaed records of all of Porter's debit card 
transactions on November 7, and the records do not show any purchases at Wayne's 
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Corner (R. 152 at 137-39).3 
Because trial counsel's objectively deficient performance was prejudicial, this 
Court should reverse Fleming's convictions under the ineffective assistance of counsel 
doctrine. See Parsons, supra. 
n. 
A NEW TRIAL IS IN ORDER BECAUSE 
FLEMING RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Fleming must demonstrate that 
trial counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards of representation, 
and that this objectively deficient performance was prejudicial. See, e.g.. Parsons v. 
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994). 
The first prong requires Fleming to overcome the "strong presumption that 
counsel's performance fell 'within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance' 
and that 'under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial 
strategy.'" State v. Cosev, 873 P.2d 1177,1179 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 
(Utah 1994). 
The prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine requires proof 
of a reasonable probability of a different result in the absence of the objectively deficient 
performance. See, og,, State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988). 
3When trial counsel led him to so testify, Mitchell explained that he was not sure if 
he had subpoenaed the record of the Wayne's Corner transaction and may have been in 
error in testifying that he had sought all records for the date of November 7, and may 
have only requested transactions involved in the alleged robbery (R. 152 at 138-140). 
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In addition to the instances of ineffective assistance addressed in Point I of this 
brief, trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient and prejudicial in numerous 
other respects. 
A. OBJECTIVELY DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE 
1. INTRODUCTION OF HARMFUL EVIDENCE AND FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE 
AND ASSERT HELPFUL EVIDENCE 
Trial counsel did not point out the bizarre nature of Porter's claim that Fleming, a 
supposed meth user, asked his supposed robbery and kidnaping victim to hold his vial of 
drugs during the course of the supposed kidnaping and robbery. Nor did he ask Porter 
how he managed to hold the vial with two fingers while he was following Fleming and 
Thompson into and out of the 7-11. Nor did he point out the unusual claim that prior to 
this supposed aggravated kidnaping and robbery, Fleming supposedly asked Porter's 
permission to smoke a cigarette in his car. Nor did trial counsel ask Porter why he was 
searching his car before he called the police to report the robbery. 
Despite the fact that Sharon Thompson was allowed to testify without any 
elaboration that she knew at some point that what they were doing was wrong (R. 152 at 
120), trial counsel did not reiterate her testimony that she used Porter's card and personal 
identification number with his express permission (R. 152 at 117), or impeach her with, or 
otherwise inform the jurors of her bias - that she was testifying against Fleming in 
exchange for transaction immunity for all conceivable offenses arising from this incident 
(R. 152 at 43-45). 
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Trial counsel repeatedly reiterated Porter's claim that Fleming held a blade to his 
throat (R. 152 at 99-100), and introduced a photograph of a weapon with two blades that 
Fleming was carrying when he was arrested about two months after the alleged robbery 
and kidnaping (R. 152 at 132-33). The prosecutor led the investigator to testify on cross 
that the weapon found on Fleming matched the description provided by Porter (R. 152 at 
148). 
Apparently recognizing trial counsel's error in introducing this damaging 
evidence, after closing argument by defense counsel, the trial court ruled that the knife 
was inadmissible and that there was no credible or other evidence that the knife found on 
Fleming was ever present on November 7 (R. 152 at 162). 
In order to convict Fleming of aggravated kidnaping, the jurors had to find that he 
held Porter against his will in connection with a felony (e.g. R. 121). The jurors were 
instructed that using a financial transaction card without the owner's consent with the 
intent to obtain property or money worth more than $1,000 is a felony (R. 119). The 
jurors were also instructed that theft of over $1,000 is a felony (R. 120). 
The only evidence that was presented that there was intent in obtaining or stealing 
more than $1,000 was the testimony of Detective Mitchell and the transaction receipts he 
presented showing withdrawals totaling $1,029 (R. 152 at 137-39; Defense Exhibits 1-7). 
This evidence was presented by trial counsel in the defense case. 
The receipts reflect that all transactions occurred between 8:19 and 9:33 p.m. 
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(defense exhibits 1-7), apparently before Porter first met Fleming, given Porter's 
testimony that he left Provo at about 9:00 p.m. to drive to Salt Lake (R. 152 at 70-72). 
Defense counsel did not point out this significant discrepancy between the physical 
evidence and Porter's version of events. 
Trial counsel's repeated introduction of harmful evidence and failure to recognize 
and assert helpful evidence constituted objectively deficient performance. See, e.g.. 
Fishery. Gibson. 282 F.3d 1283,1307 (10th Cir. 2002). 
In Fisher, the court conditionally reversed a capital conviction and death sentence 
after holding that trial counsel's trial performance in, inter alia, bolstering the State's 
case, and failing to present a defense theory and hold prosecution to its burden of proof, 
was objectively deficient and prejudicial in context of a weak government case. The 
court succinctly rejected the theory that defense counsel's omissions and commissions 
amounted to valid trial strategy, stating: 
Where an attorney accidentally brings out testimony that is damaging 
because he has failed to prepare, his conduct cannot be called a strategic 
choice: an event produced by the happenstance of counsel's uninformed and 
reckless cross-examination cannot be called a "choice" at all. 
Id. at 1296. The court reviewed the overall performance of the lawyer, including 
instances of adequate performance and inadequate performance, and concluded that the 
record did not honestly reflect a coherent trial strategy, but reflected a lack of preparation 
and diligence which undermined the necessary fimctioning of the adversary system. Id. at 
1296-1307. 
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The record of the instant case, as summarized in the statement of facts, supra, 
similarly demonstrates so many instances where trial counsel both failed to advocate Mr. 
Fleming's position, and instead actually advocated the State's case, that the adversary 
system was not functioning as it should have, and that trial counsel's performance 
unfortunately is fairly characterized as objectively deficient. 
2. FAILURE TO MOVE TO VACATE THE AGGRAVATED KIDNAPING 
CONVICTION OR FOR MERGER OF THE CONVICTIONS 
Trial counsel failed to move to dismiss or merge the aggravated kidnaping 
conviction into the aggravated robbery conviction when the evidence showed that the 
encounter between Fleming and Porter allegedly become non-consensual only when the 
robbery began (R. 152 at 78), that the alleged detention and robbery were co-extensive, as 
they drove around using various ATM machines, and that Fleming allegedly released 
Porter right before leaving Porter's car with Porter's cash and property (R. 152 at 92). 
Under very well established law, given that the detention in this case was 
incidental to and inherent in the protracted robbery, trial counsel should have challenged 
the sufficiency of the evidence for aggravated kidnaping and/or moved to merge it into 
the aggravated robbery conviction. See State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89, 92-93 (Utah 1981) 
(to avoid merger of kidnaping conviction with companion offense, State must prove that 
kidnaping was "not merely incidental or subsidiary to [the companion] crime, but was an 
independent, separately punishable offense."); State v. Finlavson. 2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 
1243 (same). 
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In Finlayson, the defendant and victim were together consensually, but when the 
victim rejected the defendant's kiss, he raped and sodomized her, and handcuffed her 
during part of the sexual offenses. Following the sexual assault, he had her wait while he 
dressed for ten minutes, put a jacket over her head to get her from his home to his car, and 
drove her around for more than thirty minutes longer than it took to get to her house, as he 
tried to persuade her not to harm herself. See kL at Iff 2-5. 
On these facts, the Utah Supreme Court found that the detention was incidental to 
and inherent in the sex crimes, and that under Couch, supra, there was no justification for 
the aggravated kidnaping conviction, explaining the rationale behind the law as follows: 
By definition, every rape and forcible sodomy is committed against the will 
of the victim and therefore involves a necessary detention, which is, of 
course, required by the kidnaping statutes. Thus, absent a clear distinction, 
virtually every rape and robbery would automatically be a kidnaping as 
well. To prevent double punishment for essentially the same act, Couch 
established a test for determining when a defendant's kidnaping conviction 
is sustainable in addition to his sexual assault convictions. To sustain 
convictions for both kidnaping and sexual assault, the prosecutor must show 
that the kidnaping detention was longer than the necessary detention 
involved in the commission of the sexual assault. Thus, the facts 
establishing the kidnaping detention must not be merely incidental to the 
sexual assault, but separate and independent therefrom. 
Id. at If 19. 
The Finlayson court recognized as helpful to its analysis this Court's three part 
test, initially set forth in State v. Buggs, 547 P.2d 720 (Kan. 1976): 
"[I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the 
commission of another crime, to be kidnaping the resulting movement or 
confinement: 
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(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other 
crime; 
(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and 
(c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it 
makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially 
lessens the risk of detection. 
Finlayson at % 23, quoting Buggs at 731. 
The Finlayson court found that there was no substantial detention that was 
independent from that inherent in the rape and sodomy, and expressly rejected the 
argument that the aggravated kidnaping charge could be sustained on the theory that 
Finlayson's conduct in making the victim wait while he got dressed, in putting a jacket 
over her head, and in driving her around for more than half an hour longer than was 
necessary to take her home, constituted actions done with the intent to facilitate flight 
after the commission of the sexual crimes. Id. at fflf 33-35. The court held that to engage 
in flight as that term is defined under the law, a defendant, at a minimum, had to both 
leave the scene of the crime and make subsequent efforts to conceal himself, withdraw or 
avoid arrest. Id, 
As with the events in Finlayson, the encounter between Porter and Fleming began 
consensually, and became a detention only when the robbery allegedly began, as an 
inherent part of the robbery. There was no evidence that Fleming made any efforts to 
evade the police or to hide out or to avoid arrest after he left Porter in his car. 
Because there was no substantial detention that was independent from the robbery, 
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the evidence was insufficient to prove aggravated kidnaping, and in failing to challenge 
that conviction or to move to vacate or merge it, trial counsel performed in an objectively 
deficient way. Compare Finlayson at ^ 24 (finding failure to challenge aggravated 
kidnaping conviction with rape and sodomy convictions was not valid strategy, but was 
objectively deficient). 
B. PREJUDICE 
Trial counsel's repeated instances of objectively deficient performance prejudiced 
Fleming, given that the State's case against him was far less than compelling. 
The only evidence which supported Porter's version of events, that Fleming pulled 
a blade and threatened him with a gun and forced him to drive to various ATMs to make 
withdrawals from Porter's account, was the testimony of Sharon Thompson, a regular 
user of cocaine, who was living at a halfway house at the time of her testimony because 
her parole had been revoked for drug use, and whom the prosecutor granted transactional 
immunity for, inter alia, aggravated kidnaping, aggravated robbery, and unlawful use of a 
financial transaction card, in exchange for her testimony (R. 152 at 43-45). 
She testified that on a day that she had been using cocaine, Fleming and Porter 
picked her up and drove her around to the ATMs while she withdrew the money with 
Porter's card, with Porter's permission, after he repeatedly gave her the personal 
identification number she needed to use with the card to get the money from the ATMs 
(R. 152 at 114-120). 
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In addition to Thompson's testimony, there was significant evidence that cast 
substantial doubt on Porter's version of events, and supported Fleming's, that Porter made 
the allegations against Fleming after realizing that he had bought rock salt from Fleming, 
rather than methamphetamine. 
A videotape and photograph of one of the ATM transactions shows Porter 
following Thompson and Fleming into and out of the 7-11 without any visible coercion of 
any kind (R. 152 at 86,140-44; State's Exhibit 1; Defendant's Exhibit 10), countering the 
notion that Fleming was holding Porter against his will and robbing him. 
Porter testified that Fleming asked Porter if he could smoke in his car (R. 152 at 
88) - peculiarly polite behavior coming from a purported aggravated kidnapper and 
robber. 
While Porter did not mention it on direct examination, Porter conceded on cross-
examination that there was a vial containing what appeared to be drugs in his car, and 
only during cross-examination, he claimed that Fleming asked Porter to hold Fleming's 
vial of methamphetamine during the course of this supposed robbery and kidnaping, 
before any of the visits to the ATM (R. 152 at 101). 
Porter did not explain why Fleming, a supposed meth user, would hand his drugs 
over to a robbery and kidnaping victim (R. 152 at 110). 
While Porter reiterated that he held the vial carefully on the edges to preserve 
Fleming's prints (R. 152 at 110, R. 151 at 21, 25), he did not explain how he managed to 
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do this when he followed Fleming and Thompson into the 7-11. 
Porter made some effort to convey how traumatized he was after the aggravated 
kidnaping and robbery, describing how he called his parents, who were at the Jordan 
River Temple (R. 152 at 93). He never did explain, however, why he felt the need to take 
the time to search the crack in his car seat where he supposedly found the vial of drugs 
before he called the police to report the robbery (R. 152 at 108-09). 
Porter claimed that despite having lived at the same location in West Valley City 
near 3500 South for the twenty-three years of his life, and despite having come home to 
visit his parents two or three times a month while staying at B YU, he was unfamiliar with 
gas stations on routes more direct from BYU to his parents' home than the Wayne's 
Comer station on 1300 South and State Street (R. 152 at 94-95). 
While Porter maintained that he was not buying drugs at Wayne's Comer, but was 
buying gasoline and mints on his debit card when he met Fleming (R. 152 at 75-76), 
Detective Mitchell testified that he subpoenaed records of all of Porter's debit card 
transactions on November 7, and the records do not show any purchases at Wayne's 
Comer (R. 152 at 137-39).4 
On the evidentiary record before this Court, there is a reasonable probability of a 
different result had trial counsel cross-examined Porter regarding his bizarre claims that 
4When trial counsel led him to so testify, Mitchell explained that he was not sure if 
he had subpoenaed the record of the Wayne's Comer transaction and may have been in 
error in testifying that he had sought all records for the date of November 7, and may 
have only requested transactions involved in the alleged robbery (R. 152 at 138-140). 
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Fleming, an alleged methamphetamine addict, required him to hold vial of drugs 
throughout the prolonged robbery, and that Porter claimed to have held the vial so 
carefully to preserve fingerprints, despite the facts that he followed Fleming and 
Thompson into and out of a 7-11, and later claimed to have found the vial in the crack of 
the seat of his car. There is a reasonable probabiUty of a different result, had trial counsel 
cross-examined Porter about why he felt the need to clean out his car before calling the 
police. There is a reasonable probability of a different result had trial counsel cross-
examined Sharon Thompson regarding the grant of immunity under which she testified; 
had trial counsel not introduced evidence that Fleming was carrying a knife at the time of 
his arrest some two months after the alleged offenses which matched the description 
provided by Porter; had trial counsel not introduced evidence that the attempted 
transactions involving Fleming and Thompson totaled more than $1,000; and had trial 
counsel sought consistent and legally sufficient jury instructions and an proper verdict. 
See Fisher, supra. 
Particularly given that Fleming is currently serving a ten to life sentence for the 
aggravated kidnaping charge, which should have been vacated or merged into the five to 
life aggravated robbery conviction, trial counsel's failure to assert the well-established 
law on Fleming's behalf was objectively deficient and prejudicial. See, e.g., Finlayson, 
2000 UT 10, % 25 (finding failure to challenge aggravated kidnaping conviction 
prejudicial, because defendant was serving concurrent ten to life term for that conviction, 
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which the board of pardons might use to confine him longer). 
Conclusion 
This Court should reverse Mr. Fleming's aggravated kidnaping conviction because 
the jury instructions and verdict may well have resulted in a non-unanimous verdict, or a 
conviction premised on a factual theory that was not charged or bound over after the 
preliminary hearing. 
This Court should reverse both the aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnaping 
convictions, because Fleming received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Because the evidence failed to demonstrate aggravated kidnaping independent 
from the aggravated robbery, and should have resulted in the vacation and/or merger of 
the aggravated kidnaping count, this Court should forbid the retrial of the aggravated 
kidnaping count. See Finlayson, supra. 
Respectfully submitted this February 22, 20J35' 
Elizabeth Huh t^^ 
Attorney ior Mr. Fleming 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on February 22, 2005,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to Assistant Attorney General Matt Bates, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. 
Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854. 
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ADDENDUM 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 10 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital cases the jury 
shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of no 
fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall establish the number of 
jurors by statute, but in no event shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In 
criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors 
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a 
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, 
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor 
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of 
that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination 
to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the 
defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 13 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by 
information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination 
be waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or without 
such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance 
of Counsel for ms defence. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV § 1 
All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the offense 
is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial 
within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or 
fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of Utah, or to pay the 
costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a husband against his 
wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no 
contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has been waived or, in case of an 
infraction, upon a judgment by a magistrate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 
(1) An actor commits kidnapping if the actor intentionally or knowingly, without 
authority of law, and against the will of the victim: 
(a) detains or restrains the victim for any substantial period of time; 
(b) detains or restrains the victim in circumstances exposing the victim to risk of bodily 
injury; 
(c) holds the victim in involuntary servitude; 
(d) detains or restrains a minor without the consent of the minorfs parent or legal guardian 
or the consent of a person acting in loco parentis, if the minor is 14 years of age or older 
but younger than 18 years of age; or 
(e) moves the victim any substantial distance or across a state line. 
(2) As used in this section, acting "against the will of the victim" includes acting without 
the consent of the legal guardian or custodian of a victim who is a mentally incompetent 
person. 
(3) Kidnapping is a second degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 
(1) An actor commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the course of committing 
unlawful detention or kidnapping: 
(a) possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-
601; or 
(b) acts with intent: 
(I) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to compel a third 
person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in particular conduct; 
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or 
attempted commission of a felony; 
(iii) to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a felony; 
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; 
(v) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function; or 
(vi) to commit a sexual offense as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses. 
(2) As used in this section, "in the course of committing unlawful detention or 
kidnapping" means in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or in the 
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a violation of: 
a) Section 76-5-301, kidnapping; or 
(b) Section 76-5-304, unlawful detention. 
(3) Aggravated kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term of not less than 6,10, or 15 years and which may be for life. 
Imprisonment is mandatory in accordance with Section 76-3-406. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304 
(1) An actor commits unlawful detention if the actor intentionally or knowingly, without 
authority of law, and against the will of the victim, detains or restrains the victim under 
circumstances not constituting a violation of: 
(a) kidnapping, Section 76-5-301; 
(b) child kidnapping, Section 76-5-301.1; or 
(c) aggravated kidnapping, Section 76-5-302. 
(2) As used in this section, acting "against the will of the victim" includes acting without 
the consent of the legal guardian or custodian of a victim who is a mentally incompetent 
person. 
(3) Unlawful detention is a class B misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (2003) 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in 
the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by 
means of force or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against 
another in the course of committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered fin the course of committing a theftf if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate flight after the attempt 
or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle, 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery' if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or 
in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
Utah R. Crim P. 7 
(a) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant shall appear 
before the court as directed in the summons. 
(b) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest with or without a warrant, the 
person arrested shall be taken to the nearest available magistrate for setting of bail. If an 
information has not been filed, one shall be filed without delay before the magistrate 
having jurisdiction over the offense. 
(c)(1) In order to detain any person arrested without a warrant, as soon as is reasonably 
feasible but in no event longer than 48 hours after the arrest, a determination shall be 
made as to whether there is probable cause to continue to detain the arrestee. The 
determination may be made by any magistrate, although if the arrestee is charged with a 
first degree felony or a capital offense, the magistrate may not be a justice court judge. 
The arrestee need not be present at the probable cause determination. 
(c)(2) A written probable cause statement shall be presented to the magistrate, although 
the statement may be verbally communicated by telephone, telefaxed, or otherwise 
electronically transmitted to the magistrate. 
(c)(2)(A) A statement which is verbally communicated by telephone shall be reduced to a 
sworn written statement prior to submitting the probable cause issue to the magistrate for 
decision. The person reading the statement to the magistrate shall verify to the magistrate 
that the person is reading the written statement verbatim, and shall write on the statement 
that person's name and title, the date and time of the communication with the magistrate, 
and the determination the magistrate directs to be indicated on the statement. 
(c)(2)(B) If a statement is verbally communicated by telephone, telefaxed, or otherwise 
electronically transmitted, the original statement shall, as soon as practicable, be filed 
with the court where the case will be filed. 
(c)(3) The magistrate shall review the probable cause statement and from it determine 
whether there is probable cause to continue to detain the arrestee. 
(c)(3)(A) If the magistrate finds there is not probable cause to continue to detain the 
arrestee, the magistrate shall order the immediate release of the arrestee. 
(c)(3)(B) If the magistrate finds probable cause to continue to detain the arrestee, the 
magistrate shall immediately make a bail determination. The bail determination shall 
coincide with the recommended bail amount in the Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule unless the 
magistrate finds substantial cause to deviate from the Schedule. 
(c)(4) The presiding district court judge shall, in consultation with the Justice Court 
Administrator, develop a rotation of magistrates which assures availability of magistrates 
consistent with the need in that particular district. The schedule shall take into account the 
case load of each of the magistrates, their location and then willingness to serve. 
(c)(5) Nothing in this subsection (c) is intended to preclude the accomplishment of other 
procedural processes at the time of the determination referred to in paragraph (c)(1) above. 
(d)(1) If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was committed the 
person arrested shall without unnecessary delay be returned to the county where the crime 
was committed and shall be taken before the proper magistrate under these rules. 
(d)(2) If for any reason the person arrested cannot be promptly returned to the county and 
the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor for which a voluntary forfeiture of bail 
may be entered as a conviction under Subsection 77-7-21(1), the person arrested may 
state in writing a desire to forfeit bail, waive trial in the district in which the information 
is pending, and consent to disposition of the case in the county in which the person was 
arrested, is held, or is present. 
(d)(3) Upon receipt of the defendant's statement, the clerk of the court in which the 
information is pending shall transmit the papers in the proceeding or copies of them to the 
clerk of the court for the county in which the defendant is arrested, held, or present. The 
prosecution shall continue in that county. 
(d)(4) Forfeited bail shall be returned to the jurisdiction that issued the warrant. 
(d)(5) If the defendant is charged with an offense other than a misdemeanor for which a 
voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under Subsection 77-7-21(1), 
the defendant shall be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the 
county of arrest for the determination of bail under Section 77-20-1 and released on bail 
or held without bail under Section 77-20-1. 
(d)(6) Bail shall be returned to the magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense, with 
the record made of the proceedings before the magistrate. 
(e) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall, upon the defendant's 
first appearance, inform the defendant: 
(e)(1) of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy; 
(e)(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the information and how 
to obtain them; 
(e)(3) of the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court without 
expense if unable to obtain counsel; 
(e)(4) of rights concerning pretrial release, including bail; and 
(e)(5) that the defendant is not required to make any statement, and that the statements the 
defendant does make may be used against the defendant m a court of law. 
(f) The magistrate shall, after providing the information under paragraph (e) and before 
proceeding further, allow the defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult 
counsel and shall allow the defendant to contact any attorney by any reasonable means, 
without delay and without fee. 
(g) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, the magistrate shall call upon 
the defendant to enter a plea. 
(g)(1) If the plea is guilty, the defendant shall be sentenced by the magistrate as provided 
by law. 
(g)(2) If the plea is not guilty, a trial date shall be set. The date may not be extended 
except for good cause shown. Trial shall be held under these rules and law applicable to 
criminal cases. 
(h)(1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, the defendant shall be advised of the right 
to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives the right to a preliminary 
examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate shall order the 
defendant bound over to answer in the district court. 
(h)(2) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the magistrate shall 
schedule the preliminary examination. The examination shall be held within a reasonable 
time, but not later than ten days if the defendant is in custody for the offense charged and 
not later than 30 days if the defendant is not in custody. These time periods may be 
extended by the magistrate for good cause shown. A preliminary examination may not be 
held if the defendant is indicted. 
(I)(l) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination shall be held under the rules 
and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has the burden of 
proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the state's case, the 
defendant may testify under oath, call witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant 
may also cross-examine adverse witnesses. 
(I)(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall 
order, in writing, that the defendant be bound over to answer in the district court. The 
findings of probable cause may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to 
evidence on the ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not properly raised at 
the preliminary examination. 
(I)(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime charged has 
been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate shall dismiss the 
information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may enter findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do not 
preclude the state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. 
(j) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either party, may 
exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require witnesses not to converse with 
each other until the preliminary examination is concluded. On the request of either party, 
the magistrate may order all spectators to be excluded from the courtroom. 
(k)(l) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district court, the 
magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall transmit to the clerk of the 
district court all pleadings in and records made of the proceedings before the magistrate, 
including exhibits, recordings, and any typewritten transcript. 
(k)(2) When a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the sheriff, the magistrate 
shall execute the appropriate commitment order. 
(1)(1) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material witness in a pending 
case will not appear and testify unless bond is required, the magistrate may fix a bond 
with or without sureties and in a sum considered adequate for the appearance of the witness. 
(1)(2) If the witness fails or refuses to post the bond with the clerk of the court, the 
magistrate may commit the witness to jail until the witness complies or is otherwise 
legally discharged. 
(1)(3) If the witness does provide bond when required, the witness may be examined and 
cross-examined before the magistrate in the presence of the defendant and the testimony 
shall be recorded. The witness shall then be discharged. 
(1)(4) If the witness is unavailable or fails to appear at any subsequent hearing or trial 
when ordered to do so, the recorded testimony may be used at the hearing or trial in lieu 
of the personal testimony of the witness. 
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VERDICT 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
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HOWARD R. LEMCKE, 3729 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
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-vs-








Screened by: H. Lemcke 
Assigned to: TBAM 
DAO # 04000779 
BAIL: $250,000 
Warrant/Release: In Jail 
AMENDED 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
CaseNo.041900437FS 
The undersigned Detective T. Mitchell - Salt Lake City Police Department, Agency Case 
No. 03-194794, under oath states on information and belief that the defendant committed the 
crimes of: 
COUNTI 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 1301 South State Street, in Salt Lake 
,2* County, State of Utah, on or about November 7, 2003, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, CARL 
STANLEY FLEMING, a party to the offense, intentionally and knowingly used force or 
fear of immediate force against Stephen Porter in the course of committing a theft of an 
operable motor vehicle. 
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AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 1301 South State Street, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about November 7, 2003, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Section 301, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, CARL 
STANLEY FLEMING, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took, or 
attempted to take, personal property in the possession of Stephen Porter, from his person, 
or immediate presence, against Stephen Porter's will, by means of force or fear, and in the 
course of committing said robbery used or threatened the use of a dangerous weapon. 
COUNTm 
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a First Degree Felony, at 1301 South State Street, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about November 7, 2003, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, CARL 
STANLEY FLEMING, a party to the offense, did intentionally or knowingly, and 
without authority of law, and against the will of Stephen Porter, by any means and in any 
manner did seize, confine, detain or transport the victim, with the intent to facilitate the 
commission or attempted commission of a felony, or flight from a felony. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
T. Mitchell, S. Thompson, S. Porter, L. Hardwick, N. Gardner, J. O'Connor, C. Logan, 
D. Aryazand and R. Hensley 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant, T. Mitchell, a detective with the Salt Lake Police Department, on 
information and belief bases this affidavit upon the following: 
Your affiant was informed by Stephen Porter, that oa or about November 7, 2003, at 
1400 South Richards Street, in Salt Lake County, Utah, a person identified as the defendant, 
CARL STANLEY FLEMING, held a switchblade knife to Porter's neck, and demanded Porter's 
vehicle, and that the defendant demanded Porter's debit card. Mr. Porter stated to your affiant 
that the defendant got into the driver's seat of Porter's vehicle and drove Porter to 1300 South 
State Street, where an unidentified female person got into the car, and that the defendant gave 
Porter's debit card to the female. Mr. Porter stated that the defendant drove to two 7-11 stores, 
1300 East 900 South and 900 East 200 South, and Wells Fargo Bank, 300 East 300 South, where 
the female used his debit card at the ATMs to make cash withdrawals, and that Mr. Porter 




drove Mr. Porter to 300 East 200 South, where the female got out of the vehicle. The defendant 
drove Mr. Porter to the State Fairgrounds area, got out of the vehicle and left on foot. 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
DAWD E. YOCOM, District Attorney 
DETECTIVE T. MITCHELL 
Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this "£, ? 
day of March, 2004. 
MAGISTRATE 
Deputy DistrioCAttomey 
January 22, 2004 
SH/sr/04000779 
THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL STANLEY FLEMING, JR., 
Defendant. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
JUDGE: DENISE POSSE LINDBERG 
CASE NO. 041900437 
The jury is hereby charged with the law that applies to this case, as reflected in 
instructions numbered ( / ) through (3&), inclusive. 
DATED this fit)~ day of _,20^ -/. 
HONORABLE DEMISE POSSE LIMDBERG 
JUDGE, THIRD DISTRICT COURjl 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
•w-
Members of the jury, we have now reached the stage in the proceedings where all of the 
evidence and testimony is in. Just three things remain to be done. 
First, it is my duty to give you the law that will govern your deliberations. 
Second, following my instructions the attorneys will summarize their respective positions 
on the case. The prosecutor has the right to give a final rebuttal after the defense has argued its 
case to you. That is because the prosecutor bears the burden of proof in all criminal cases. 
Third, and last, will be your deliberations for the purpose of reaching a verdict. 
INSTRUCTION NO. _£ 
Your function as members of the jury is to decide the issues of fact raised by the charges. 
You are the sole judges of the facts, but your verdict must be based on the evidence presented, 
rather than on mere conjecture. 
It is also your sworn duty to follow the law as given in these instructions. The 
instructions, though given separately, are to be considered and construed as one connected whole. 
In other words, each instruction should be understood in reference to, and as a part of, the entire 
charge, and not as though any one sentence or instruction states the whole law on a particular 
point. You may not disregard, or give special attention to, any of the instructions. The order in 
which the instructions are given has no special meaning, and does not imply that some 
instructions are relatively more important than others. 
It is not your role to question the wisdom or correctness of the rules contained in these 
instructions. You may not substitute the rules and principles contained in these instructions with 
your own notions or opinions as to what the law is, or ought to be. Apply the law as given to you 
in these instructions, regardless of the consequences. 
In performing your duties as members of the jury you must not permit yourselves to be 
influenced by pity for the defendant, nor by passion or prejudice against the defendant. You must 
also not allow yourselves to be influenced by public opinion or public feeling. Do not allow 
yourselves to be biased against the defendant because criminal charges have been brought against 
the defendant, or because he has been brought to trial. The filing of charges against a defendant 
is not evidence of guilt. Accordingly, you must not infer or speculate, from this fact alone, that 
the defendant is guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. j ; 
Under our criminal justice system anyone charged with a crime is presumed to be 
innocent until his or her guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This presumption of 
imiocence is a substantial and essential part of the law, and you are required by law to begin your 
deliberations from this initial premise. 
This presumption must continue until such time when, after reviewing and considering all 
the evidence, each of you is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. If, after 
considering all the evidence, one or more of you has a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's 
guilt, then the defendant must be found "not guilty" of the charge for which reasonable doubt 
exists. 
INSTRUCTION NO. jjjf 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof that satisfies and convinces each 
of you (acting conscientiously in your sworn capacity as jurors) that the defendant is guilty of the 
offense charged. 
You have "reasonable doubt" if, after you impartially consider all the evidence in the 
case, you can candidly say that: 
(a) you are not satisfied that the defendant is guilty, or 
(b) the evidence reasonably permits you to conclude either way as to defendant's 
guilt or innocence. 
If you have reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant "not guilty." 
On the other hand, you have no reasonable doubt if, after you impartially consider all the 
evidence in the case, you can truthfully say that: 
(a) you have an abiding conviction of the defendant's guilt, or 
(b) the evidence reasonably permits only one conclusion-that of guilt. 
The State's proof must eliminate all reasonable doubt. If you have no reasonable doubt 
you must find the defendant "guilty". 
A fanciful or wholly speculative possibility is not the same as "reasonable doubt," 
because most everything relating to human affairs is open to some possible doubt. A reasonable 
doubt is one that is substantial and based on reason. It is doubt which objective, impartial and 
reasonable men and women would have after considering all the evidence that has been presented 
to you. It must arise from the evidence, or the lack of evidence, in this case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. f 
Each of you as jurors must decide the issues for yourselves, but you should do so only 
after considering and discussing the case with your fellow jurors. It is rarely productive for a 
juror, upon entering the jury room and before the jury has had time to deliberate, to commit 
himself or herself to a certain verdict. 
Remember that you are not partisans or advocates in this matter, but rather judges. 
During your deliberations you will be discussing and weighing the evidence with your fellow 
jurors. If, in that process, you become convinced that an earlier opinion was wrong, do not 
hesitate to change your opinion. Do not let pride of opinion possess you to such an extent that 
you cannot listen fairly to the views of your fellow jurors. Do not, however, surrender your own 
honest convictions concerning the evidence simply in order to return a verdict. 
INSTRUCTION NO. Jl 
In arriving at a verdict in this case you must not discuss or consider what penalty or 
punishment may result from a conviction. That is something that is exclusively the concern of 
the Court and other governmental agencies. It must not in any way affect your decision as to the 
innocence or guilt of the defendant. 
INSTRUCTION NO. j £ 
If, during the trial, I have said or done anything that suggests to you that I favor the claims 
or position of either side, you must not allow yourselves to be influenced by that perception. 
You are the sole judges of the facts, and it would be improper for me to suggest an opinion as to 
which witnesses should be believed, or which party should prevail. 
INSTRUCTION NO. % 
You are the sole judges of the importance of the evidence, the believability of the 
witnesses, and the facts. There is no firm rule I can give you in determining the truthfulness or 
believability of a witness. You should use your own good judgment and experience in life in 
determining whether you believe the testimony of the witness(es), and in determining what 
weight you will give to witness(es)' testimony. 
You may consider such things as: 
• the appearance and conduct of a witness while testifying, 
• the apparent frankness or lack of frankness of the witness, 
• whether a witness contradicted himself or herself, 
• the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the witness' testimony, 
• the ability of the witness to observe, understand, and remember what the 
witness has seen and heard. 
You may also apply any other common sense yardstick you think appropriate. You may 
consider what motive the witness may have for testifying, and what interest, if any, the witness 
may have in the outcome of the case. 
The mere fact that a witness is a police officer, by itself, does not make that witness' 
testimony more or less credible, or entitled to more or less weight, than that of any other witness. 
You are not bound to believe all that a witness has testified to, nor are you bound to 
believe any witness. You may believe one witness as against many, or many as against one, as 
your own honest convictions dictate. If you conclude that a witness has willfully testified falsely 
as to any important fact in this case, you may disregard all or a portion of that witness' testimony, 
or you may give it such weight (that is, convincing force) as you think it is entitled. 
It is your duty to reach a verdict based solely on the evidence presented during the trial. 
In reaching your verdict you should consider all of the evidence together, fairly, impartially and 
conscientiously. Where there is conflicting evidence, you should reconcile those conflicts as far 
as you reasonably can. If the conflicts in the evidence cannot be reconciled, you are the final 
judges of the facts. You must determine from the evidence what the true facts are. 
INSTRUCTION NO. jj_ 
The lawyers are officers of the Court. It is their duty to present the evidence on behalf of 
their respective clients, and to argue fully their client's position. That includes making whatever 
objections to the evidence they think are proper. Keep in mind, however, that the lawyers are 
here in a partisan capacity-that is to say, it is their duty and responsibility to be an advocate. 
Unless the lawyers stipulate to particular facts in open court (in which case the Court will 
instruct you to accept those facts as true), any other statements that the lawyers may make during 
trial or in closing arguments are not to be considered by you as evidence in this trial. 
If at any time during the trial (including closing arguments) the lawyers make statements 
about the evidence that do not conform with what you remember was presented, you should 
disregard those statements and rely on your own recollection of the evidence. This same 
instruction applies to any statements that the attorneys may make about the law, if those 
statements differ from the law contained in these instructions. If that occurs, you should 
disregard those statements and rely only on these instructions. 
INSTRUCTION NO. J £ 
During the trial I may have had to make decisions as to whether certain evidence can be 
properly admitted. You should not be concerned with the reasons for my rulings on those issues, 
nor should you draw any inferences from those decisions. Whether offered evidence is 
admissible is purely a question of law. If I admitted evidence over counsel's objection, you 
should not read into that any opinion on my part regarding what weight you should give to that 
evidence, nor whether you should believe the evidence. That is for you to decide. Do not 
consider evidence offered but not accepted by me (if any), nor any evidence that I may have 
ordered stricken. 
If I sustained an objection to certain questions or other evidence, that means that I 
concluded that there were proper legal reasons why that evidence should not be considered by 
you in reaching your verdict. As a result, don't speculate about the reason for the objection or 
about what the answer might have been. 
INSTRUCTION NO. // 
The Constitution gives the defendant the right to decide whether or not he wants to 
testify. If the defendant testifies, you should give his testimony the same consideration, and 
evaluate it in the same way, as you would any other witness' testimony. The fact that the 
defendant has been accused of a crime is not evidence of guilt and is not an appropriate basis for 
rejecting his testimony. 
Because the law expressly gives defendants the privilege of not testifying, you may not 
infer that the defendant is guilty, or draw other negative inferences about the defendant, if he 
decides not to testify. 
Regardless of whether the defendant testified or declined to do so, the important thing for 
you to remember is that the prosecution always bears the burden of proving the defendant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1<U 
When you retii' . someone to serve as the jury 
ImrpiTsori, You will Uo given a \eidiri lonn which the foreperson will fill out and sign., on 
behalf of the entire jury. For each charge that hat been biottjjjii ayainsi ih<i defendant fhr \erdict 
form will li:nv Uvn blimkr, ni"' loi "):»iniiv"' and the other for "not guilty." ' Ilie foreperson will 
fill in the appropriate blank to reflect the jury's unanimous decision as to each. 011 ense, 111 1111111y. 
•out the form the foreperson needs lo make sun liml <nil'/ \ mr blmik is marked for each charge. 
Because this is a criminal case, every single juror must agree with the verdict, In making 
your decisions you may not draw straws, flip a coin, or decide by majui i(\ \ u(e flu |in \ s 
verdict must repi v. *L . ;. • • • ireful, and conscientious judgment 
concerning the defendant's guilt or innocence on each charge. 
INSTRUCTION NO. / 3 
There are two general classes of evidence: (1) "direct" evidence and (2) "circumstantial" 
evidence. I will explain the two types in a moment, but the important thing to remember is that 
you can base your verdict legitimately on either type of evidence. The law does not treat one 
type of evidence as better than the other in terms of its value, effectiveness or convincing force. 
However, before you can find the defendant guilty of the charge that has been brought 
against him, there has to be sufficient evidence (whether direct, circumstantial, or some of both) 
so that you are individually and collectively convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
• "Direct" evidence of a person's conduct is presented when a witness, by using 
his/her own physical senses (i.e., seeing, touching, hearing, tasting, smelling), is 
able to perceive the conduct at issue, and can describe what the witness perceived 
at a particular time. 
• "Circumstantial" evidence is anything else that isn't "direct" evidence as I have 
explained it. In other words, when certain facts or circumstances are known to 
exist, you can then rely on common human experience to deduce, or draw 
reasonable inferences about, the existence of other connected facts. 
For example: If you were looking out the window and saw that the sky was gray, stormy, and 
drops of water were coming down, you could testify in court about what you saw, and that would 
be "direct" evidence that it was raining. 
By contrast, if, on that same day, you were in a windowless room (such as this 
courtroom), and someone walked in wearing a raincoat covered with drops of water and carrying 
r t i i i i i i iM KV,\\ |i i n n 
JOJUT /(jqmiosBai p]uoo noX ipiijM, HTO MUOAV jBip. 'eipjqum JOA\ *e 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
"Intent" refers to the state of mind of the defendant at the time the defendant acted (or 
failed to act), and suggests that the defendant had a purpose in so acting. Because it is a state of 
mind, determining a person's intent cannot generally be established by "direct" evidence. 
Ordinarily, a person's intent in acting is inferred from his other acts, statements, or from all the 
circumstances involved. 
You should not confuse "intent" with "motive." Motive is what prompts a person to act 
(or not act). Intent refers only to the state of mind with which an act is done. Motive is not an 
element of any offense. As a result, the prosecutor is not required to prove that the defendant had 
any particular motive in acting as he did. The defendant's motive in acting is irrelevant except to 
the extent that evidence of motive can help you determine what his intent was at the time of his 
actions in this case. 
4 
INSTRUCTION NO. _j^ 
A separate : v.r- nr offense is charged ir: each count o1 t UP 
information. Each cna: j- - ;-r..--~ pertaining to it 
•should ^ considered separately. "!ne fact iuai. you may fun I ilit 
accused 'junLv * "MP- offenses charged 
should not contioi youi" verdict: as -f; ,J,ij oi-iv.j :u : -jiitse. ehai«jtjci. 
INSTRUCTION NO. /fr 
Under the law of the State of Utah, robbery is the unlawful 
and intentional taking of personal property in the possession of 
another from his person, or immediate presence, against his 
will, accomplished by means of force or fear. A person commits 
aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, that 
person uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon; or causes 
serious bodily injury upon another. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ft 
Before you c,-.:, - • } <-ndant, ' '^r] Stanley Fleming, 
• :>f the offense ' Aggravated Robbery as cnarged i n r'juiii I -1 
t, • • r- -• - ,•, rn* • ! f iir] I •* M; J " ! •! the evidence and 
oeyona • reasonable doubt each iiid ^ V M \ i,, I "I1 lollowinq 
elements of that offense: 
1. , :ay of November, 2 0 03, .in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant C\ni Stanley 
F] enii i lg, took personal property then in the possession oi, 
Stephen Porter from his person m i minedicU.i:; presence; and 
2. That such taking v;an unlawful; and 
3. in.^ . n . , rational; and 
4 That such taking wab against the will of Stephei i 
Porter; and 
That sueh L dR i 11<j wa s ac comp] i shed by i i: i.eai Is < :) f force or 
fear; and 
6. That in the course of committing such taking, a 
dangerous weapon was used. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
ihir. ti.isc, ytMt ,IM convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonaoie duulii 
must find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Robbery as charged 
in coin it I of tl le i nfor t nati on ' trie other hand, you are 
not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of 
the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not 
guilty of count I. 
INSTRUCTION NO. /g 
' "Unlawful" means that which is contrary to law or 
unauthorized by law, or, without legal justification, or, 
illegal. 
A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent 
or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a 
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
"Personal property" mean anything of value, and includes 
money. 
INSTRUCTION NO. /f 
"Dangerous weapon" means cu<y item capable o^ causing death 
or serious bodil y injury, nr ?} .- _^ .. .: e sent at ion n\ 
the item, and: 
(a) ti le act01 ' s i ise < n apparent :i ntended use ol 
the item leads the victim to reasonably believe the 
item is likely to cause death or serious bodily 
i n ; ^  . 
; he actor represents to the victim verbally 
•.;i-.ner that the actor is in
 c o n t r o l of 
such ai 1 item. 
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or 
causes serious pe2: manent dj s f :i g i iren lei 11, prot:] : acted 3 oss : • :i : 
impairment, of the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
creates a substantial risk of death. 
Ai i act shall be considered to be "j n I he course < 
committing a robbery" if :i 1 occurs in ai I attempt to commit, 
d i i r i n g 11 I e c o n it i: i :i s s :i o n c f • :> :i : i i i t h e :i n u n e d :i a t e f 3 i g 1 11 a f t e r t h e 
attempt or commission of a robbery. 
Ai I attempt occurs i f a person is acting with the kind of 
c i i ] p a b :i 1 :i t y o 11 i e i: w i s e r e < 31 1 i 11 e d f < : 1 11 1 e » :: o n 11: 1 1 i s s i c > 1 1 o f a 1 1 o f f e n s e 
and engages ii 1 conduct constituting a substantial step towards 
commission of the offense. 
Conduct does not co 1 1 s111u 1 :< * a substant:i a] st ep u 1 11 ess :i 1 :i s 
strongly corroborative of the person's intent to commit, the 
offense. 
INSTRUCTION NO. £J) 
Under the law of the State of Utah, a person commits 
Aggravated Kidnapping if that person intentionally or knowingly, 
without authority of law and against the will of the victim, by 
any means and in any manner seizes, confines, detains, or 
transports the victim with intent: 
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or 
hostage, or to compel a third person to engage in particular 
conduct or to forbear from engaging in particular conduct; or 
(b) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or 
flight after commission or attempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim 
or another. 
INSTRUCTION MO, _^[ 
Every person, acting with, the mental state reqt i:i i ed for tl le 
.. ;.Sion 0f the offense who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, request.- • . . . .• m*^ , ui j ntpntionally ai ds 
another person to engage in conduci whuJi constitutes an offer lse 
••'•hal J t":» <M imir . . y liable as a party for such conduct. 
INSTRUCTION NO. «gg* 
You are instructed that use of a financial transaction card 
without the consent of the owner, with the intent to obtain 
money or property in excess of $1000 is a felony. 
INSTRUCTTn; NO. ££ 
You are instructed that thett of over $1000 is a felony. 
INSTRUCTION NO. J2*f 
Before you can convict the defendant, Carl Stanley Fleming, 
of the offense of Aggravated Kidnapping as charged in count II 
of the information, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following 
elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 7th day of November, 2003, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Carl Stanley 
Fleming, did by any means and in any manner, seize, confine, 
detain, or transport Stephen Porter; and 
2. That such seizure, confinement, detention, or 
transportation was done intentionally or knowingly; and 
3. That such seizure, confinement, detention, or 
transportation was against the will of Stephen Porter, and 
without authority of law; and 
4. That such seizure, confinement, detention, or 
transportation was committed with the intent to facilitate the 
commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or 
attempted commission of a felony. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Kidnapping as 
charged in count II of the information. If, on the other hand, 
you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or 
more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant 
not guilty of count II. 
INSTRUCTION . ^ ; 
Ynii ,'ire instructed that Robbery is a felony. 
THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL STANLEY FLEMING, JR., 
Defendant. 
VERDICT 
JUDGE: DENISE POSSE LINDBERG 
CASE NO. 041900437 
We, the jury in the above-captioned case, find and render the following verdict concerning the 
defendant CARL STANLEY FLEMING, JR. 
As to the Count of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, we find the defendant: 
^ Guilty 
Not Guilty. 
As to the Count^ pf AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, we find the defendant: 
Guilty 
Not Guilty 
Dated this 20th day of May, 2004. 
£#•&&? 7Z. *t^&7 /? 
Jury Foreperson 
Filed _, 2003 
Clerk of the Court 
By:_ 
Deputy Clerk 
